Thinking about the consequences should be a priority. Now, we need to ask ourselves about our expectations following the last shots of Russian and Ukrainian weaponry. Every conflict eventually comes to an end, even if only due to the exhaustion of the warring parties. However, the end of the shooting itself does not bring peace, not to mention that there are types of peace that are even worse than war.
The end of peace means that we must critically reflect on what we are willing to accept as “restored peace” beyond the cessation of war – the critical idea of “restored peace,” and then the steps towards it.
The greatest minds do not always reason the same. Jürgen Habermas, certainly not to be suspected of warmongering, co-authored a manifesto with Derrida against the invasion of Iraq in May 2022 and points out that our pursuit of peace should not be confused with “sacrificing political freedom on the altar of mere survival” (Habermas, 2022). Last year, towards the end of the first year of the war, he softened his stance to discuss negotiations with a vaguely preventive quality, shielding us from a dramatic dilemma: “either actively intervene in the war or risk sparking the first World War between nuclear powers by leaving Ukraine to its fate” (Habermas, 2023).
It is essential to note that in this article, he addresses the short-term issue of meeting Ukraine’s increasing demands for modern weapons. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg notes, “Regardless of when and how this war ends, we must accept that the security situation in Europe is permanently altered” (Stoltenberg, 2023). However, I am interested in the more general question of the goals towards which “we” – not just the EU, not just the EU and the US, not just NATO member countries, but all those who care about democracy (in the east and west, north and south) should aim on a global scale after the end of the gunfire.
![](https://www.eurozine.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Tsyrkuny_tank-1024x768.jpg)
Source: Wikimedia Commons
Before delving into the answer to this question, we can pause to explore three ways Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has changed the world.
First: the potential of global parliamentary institutions has been deeply affected. In the early 21st century, in an article titled “Parliamentary Governance of the World,” M. Walzer outlined several possible forms of global parliamentarism and institutionalization. The status quo (established around Kofi Annan’s leadership at the UN, finalizing the conceptualization of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, later adopted in 2006 by Ban Ki-moon) appears as a relatively conservative order at that time. Currently, it seems like a utopia. Even the “realistic utopia” of Rawls, sometimes criticized for admitting decent peoples into the Society of Peoples, ready to implement only a truncated list of human rights and to limit states that step outside the “lawful,” is no longer “realistic” in the presence of an aggressive, expansionist state with nuclear weapons.
Second, the global market for goods and services has long been a reason for peaceful communication and dampening the aggression of authoritarian states. This becomes a leitmotif following Montesquieu’s thesis from The Spirit of the Laws, that “The natural effect of trade is peace” (quoted in Van Parijs, 2023), subsequently emphasized by Thomas Paine’s optimistic view in Rights of Man, who says: “If trade is allowed to develop to the extent it is capable of globally, it would eradicate war from the system” (quoted in Van Parijs, 2023). From Kant’s hint that republics do not wage war on each other, through Mead’s idea that “the economic process leads to people coming closer to each other” (Mead, 1974, p. 322), to the so-called Ostpolitik – from Brandt to Merkel, which can be synthesized in the motto “Wandel durch Handel” (Change through Trade). However, it has become evident that trade and commercial exchange can be used as weapons. Dependence on energy resources, fuels, minerals, and high-tech products turned trade into a tool for political pressure and contributed to the aggression of those in privileged positions. Consequently, interdependence on imports and trade has shifted from a stability factor to an instability factor, significantly increasing the importance of national or, at best, regional self-sufficiency and independence from global exchange processes. As a result, both globalization, idealized in the past, and so-called “deglobalization” seem equally unlikely. Perhaps we are moving towards differentiating globalization: a mixture of globalized trade in strategically inert goods and services and regional or national self-sufficiency for strategically important resources.
Third, the world as an international community of 195 countries seems re-polarized: on one side are the democratic countries, grouped in NATO but including Australia and East Asia, and on the other, the significantly less integrated countries from all continents who either support, do not openly condemn, or have no relation to the invasion of Ukraine. Long-term instability could result from two interrelated factors: a) these countries are united not as they were during the Cold War around two, but around three superpowers; and b) the fact that the first group of countries contains 50% of global GDP but only 12% of the world’s population, making it vulnerable to the accusation that it is the global club of wealthy countries.
One could assume that none of these factors will change significantly over the next 2-3 decades, at least until 2050. If so, what kind of world would a critically-minded individual want to direct their efforts towards, and what democratic regions should they strive for?
The contribution of a critical position on justice is aimed at reducing the tension opposing the goal of achieving global security for all democratic countries – a goal that requires closer military and trade cooperation, including energy, among democracies, as well as the effort to prevent the affirmation and spread of the inappropriate image of the richest minority of 12%, further consolidating their actions to create a global refuge in defense of their own privilege. The other two superpowers, Russia and China, and if we add their closest supporters, combined account for around 17% of the world’s population, which is not far from being democratic. This means that over 2/3 of the people in the world are observing the dramatic events in Ukraine with more or less sympathy for one of the two sides. The state of the world in 2050 will largely depend on the possible consensus among these 2/3 of the world’s population and their elites: a consensus on what?
It is unlikely that there will be a consensus in support of democracy as the dominant system. Because elections – the hallmark of democracy yesterday and today, especially given that only three countries in the world lack them – often serve as a shield, albeit a necessary one, without being a sufficient condition for democracy. It requires party pluralism, freedom of speech, the press, religion, movement, and association. A global acceptance of all these conditions seems improbable.
Therefore, the consensus that we, critical democrats, should strive to achieve among these 2/3 of living human beings must have a broader scope than that of democracy. It should be a consensus on the priority application of what is already present in the United Nations Charter: a ban on military and aggressive actions against the territorial integrity of another recognized state regardless of the essence of the conflict. This is the basis of a truly post-Westphalian world order, whether that order directly governs a few hundred independent states or three empires and their clients. Wasn’t there already agreement on this, explicitly spelled out in the United Nations Charter? Apparently, only formally, as evidenced by the current conflict in Ukraine. This is the first task on which the alliance of existing democracies must achieve global consensus. No one is safe in a world where nuclear weapons are possessed by 11 states and the principles of the territorial integrity of each country are only words. This is the first sign that could be perceived by every sovereign in the world, regardless of their democratic status. Turning the thesis into a slogan: the plea for global rule of law could be embraced by sovereign states less susceptible to the plea for democracy.
Next, attention must be paid to those on the brink of partisanship and only partial acceptance of democracy but are on the verge of direct involvement in the conflict in Ukraine, without considering similar situations elsewhere. This undeniable and stark aspect of the current complex situation must be addressed by pointing out that such selective compassion is an indictment not against those aiding at least one victim (regardless of the absence of aid provided to other victims due to impossibility or unwillingness) but against the lack of global rule of law through institutions capable of preventing any territorial integrity violation anywhere, not just violations that are of strategic importance to someone. Without such institutions or due to their inefficacy, the only choice for a small force would be – as in medieval treaties of subjugation/protection – to become a strategic factor for a superpower. It is precisely the small states, rather than anyone else, that would benefit most from strict adherence to the United Nations Charter. This would come at the expense of protection hanging on a veto, leaving them dependent on the random alignment of the political interests of the strong regarding support for them.
However, we live in dark times because beyond the indescribable suffering of the Ukrainian people, the long-term price the world pays for the Russian invasion brings back the discussion of global institutions, no longer viewed as pillars of prosperity but as mere guarantees of survival and basic security. Furthermore, the role of the paralyzed UN (held back by the veto institution) has shrunk to the level of ineffectiveness of the League of Nations. Will the General Assembly ever manage to exert enough pressure on Russia to accept a change in the veto’s power?
Bibliography
Habermas, J. (2022) „War and Indignation. The West’s Red Line Dilemma“. Reset. Dialogues on Civilization, 6.05. https://www.resetdoc.org/story/jurgen-habermas-war-indignation-west-red-line-dilemma/ [Accessed 15.05.2023].
Habermas, J. (2023) „Ein Plädoyer für Verhandlungen“. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15.02. https://www.sueddeutsche.de/projekte/artikel/kultur/juergen-habermas-ukraine-sz-verhandlungen-e159105/?reduced=true [Accessed 15.05.2023].
Mead, G. (1974) Mind, Self, & Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Stoltenberg, J. (2023) Speech of 5.01.2023 at the Annual Conference at the Confederation of the Norwegian Enterprise. https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/opinions_210445.htm?selectedLocale=fr [Accessed 15.05.2023].
Van Parijs, Ph. (2023) „Has the Russo-Ukrainian war killed the doux commerce thesis?“. Brussels Times, 17.01. https://www.brusselstimes.com/353010/has-the-russo-ukrainian-war-killed-the-doux-commerce-thesis [Accessed 15.05.2023].